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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, J 
Plaintiff and : 
Appellant, : 
vs. : 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON 
Defendant and 
Respondent. : 
: Case No. 870241-CA 
: Priority No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Rule 3(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This is an appeal from a 
final order or judgement of the Second Judicial District Court. 
Legislation creating the Utah Court of Appeals granted this Court 
the specific authority to review decisions in domestic relations 
cases. The original action herein was an action for divorce. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of a judgement rendered by the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist awarding child support, alimony, and dividing 
the estate of the parties. The judgement was entered on May 22, 
1987, and the Notice of Appeal was timely filed on June 19, 1987. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the Appellant should be awarded a monetary 
interest in Respondent's medical license. 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in the method it adopted 
in assessing the value of Respondent's interest in the 
professional corporation, Associates of Pathology. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by basing its award of 
alimony upon a projected future income which was substantially 
below the average income of Dr. Johnson in the preceding five 
years. 
4. Whether the Appellant should be awarded more than 
$1,000.00 per month alimony for 120 months based upon 
Respondent's average earnings over the last five years of between 
$150,000.00 and $190,000.00, Appellant having no outside earnings 
of her own. 
5. Whether the trial court erred in limiting child support 
to $648.00 per child per month based upon its interpretation of 
the Uniform Child Support Schedule to mean that a supporting 
parent who earns more than $120,000.00 per year should not be 
assessed more than a parent making only $120,000.00 because the 
Schedule does not extend beyond a parental income of $120,000.00. 
6. Whether the Appellant should be awarded one half of 
Respondent's income during the time the two were separated, but 
prior to their divorce. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on August 19, 1966, and they were 
separated on or about February lf 1986. An action for Separate 
Maintenance was filed by the Appellant and an action for Divorce 
was filed by way of Counterclaim by Respondent. The matter was 
heard in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding, 
on the 20th and 23rd days of March, 1987. 
The parties married after the Respondent had completed one 
year of medical school. Respondent's parents paid costs incurred 
by Respondent for tuition and books only during his schooling. 
While the Respondent attended Medical School in St. Louis, 
Missouri, Appellant was employed by the St. Louis Globe Democrat, 
and except for the tuition and the books, she supported 
Respondent during his remaining three years of medical school. 
Respondent's contribution to his medical school expenses were 
that he obtained a small scholarship during his final year of 
medical school in the sum of $400.00, and he had a part-time job 
during his third and fourth years of medical school. The average 
weekly pay from his part time employment was $150.00 per month. 
He had the part time job for a period of 21 months. Other that 
the contributions mentioned above, the sole supporter of the 
family during the final three years of Respondent's medical 
school training, was the Appellant, Mrs. Johnson. 
Following graduation from medical school, the respondent 
began a one-year internship. Appellant continued to work during 
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this one-year period, contributing her earnings to the support of 
the family. Following completion of a one year internship, 
Respondent began training as a resident in pathology. At that 
time, the parties mutually decided to begin their family. The 
parties further agreed that Appellant would not continue to work, 
but would serve the family as a full-time homemaker and mother. 
Appellant terminated her work, and over the next few years three 
children were born to the marriage. 
Appellant earnings from The St. Louis Globe Democrat gross 
were about $13,960.00, which approximately equalled the estimated 
costs of supporting the family during that time which was roughly 
$14,725.00. The figure of $14,725.00 was calculated by 
multiplying $475.00, the estimated monthly cost of living during 
the time Dr. Johnson was in medical school, by the 31 months he 
spent in school. 
Upon graduation from medical school, the Dr. Johnson served 
his internship with the Public Health Service in Seattle, 
Washington. He was an intern from July 1969, through July, 1970. 
Thereafter, he became served his residency with the Public Health 
Service in Seattle, Washington, from June, 1970 to June, 1974. In 
that month, Respondent accepted a position with his present 
employer, Associates of Pathology, Inc., of Ogden, Utah, where he 
continues to be employed at the present time. By mutual 
agreement and consent of the parties, Mrs. Johnson has not been 
employed outside the home since 1970, and although she received a 
Bachelor of Arts Degree from Weber Sate College, she has not 
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pursued any career as a result of that degree, due to her 
commitment as a homemaker. 
At the time of the trial in March of 1987, the parties had 
assets with a fair market value of approximately $850,000.00 to 
$900,000.00. (See, Exhibit entitled "Proposal for Settlement" 
dated 1/20/87 entered as evidence during opening arguments by Mr. 
Farr, Tr. p. 10, Exhibit No. unknown). These assets consisted of 
real and personal property including stocks, bonds, cash, pension 
and retirement funds. The parties have agreed that the 
aforementioned assets would be divided equally, with each party 
receiving approximately 50 percent of their value. (Tr. p. 7, 
In. 4-10). The tangible assets have been divided by agreement of 
the parties. 
At trial, Appellant put on evidence to establish the value 
of Respondent's interest in the professional corporation, 
Associates of Pathology. To estimate the value of Respondent's 
interest in the aforementioned corporation, Appellant retained 
the services of the accounting firm of KBMG-Peat Marwick, the 
fourth largest accounting firm in the world, (Tr. p. 58, lines 
15-22), with offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, as expert witnesses 
with respect to the value of respondent's medical practice. 
Merrill Norman (Tr. pp. 57-206) and John Brough (Tr. pp. 111-113) 
testified as expert witnesses from that firm at the District 
Court Trial. The accountants did extensive research into the 
valuation of the medical practice, their accounting services 
totalling more than $8,000.00. However, in spite of the effort 
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and expertise that went into the valuation of the medical 
practice by Appellant's experts, the trial court held that the 
accountant's valuation of the medical practice was not credible. 
(Conclusions of Law, No. 4). 
Although the trial court awarded the Appellant a 50 percent 
interest in the Respondent's medical practice, (Conclusions of 
Law No. 9) the manner in which the trial court valued the medical 
practice is disputed. The trial court held "That the value of 
defendant's interest in the Associates of Pathology, a 
professional corporation, is $14,521.00." (Findings of Fact, No. 
18). The trial court valued the Dr. Johnson's interest in the 
professional corporation by adopting the method of valuation 
proposed by the Respondent, and used by the professional 
corporation in their buy-out agreement. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 
9-D referred to in the transcript of the record at pp. 119-20). 
Essentially, the buy-out agreement states that in the event that 
a member of Associates of Pathology decides to leave the 
professional corporation, or dies, the equipment, the cash on 
hand, and the accounts receivable are added together and the sum 
of those assets constitutes the worth of the leaving member's 
portion of the association. 
Appellant argued at trial that the Respondent's portion of 
Associates of Pathology, should be valued as an ongoing concern, 
rather than according to the buy-out agreement referred to above, 
which contemplates the termination of a member's interest in the 
corporation. 
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According to the method of valuation used by Appellant's 
expertsf the Respondent's portion of the association, valued as a 
going concern, was approximately $154,997.00, (see Exhibit 8-P). 
The trial court adopted the method of valuation proposed by 
Respondent referred to above, and determined the value of 
Respondent's medical practice to be the total of Respondent's 
equipment, cash on hand, and accounts receivable, which was 
valued at $14,521.00. (Findings of Fact, No. 18). According to 
the trial court's determination, the Appellant was awarded fifty 
percent of the $14,521.00, or $7,260.50. (Conclusions of Law No. 
9). 
The trial court awarded the Appellant $1,000.00 per month in 
alimony for a period of ten years, or until the Appellant 
remarries, cohabits with another, or dies. (Conclusions of Law 
No. 8 ) . 
Child support was awarded to the Appellant in the amount of 
$648.00 per child per month. (Conclusions of Law No. 3). At the 
trial, the parties agreed that the child support be based upon 
the Uniform Child Support Schedule as used by the courts in the 
Second Judicial District. (Tr. p. 12, In. 8) However, the 
parties disagreed as to whether the Uniform Schedule was to have 
a ceiling, or whether it was meant to be extended at the same 
percentage rates until the child support becomes commensurate 
with the supporting parent's income. (Tr. at 12-13). The 
Appellant's position is that the Utah Uniform Child Support 
Schedule arbitrarily ends at an annual income level of 
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$120,000.00 and was meant to continue to extend the child support 
amounts at the same rates until a figure is arrived at that 
coincides with the income of the parent paying the child support. 
Respondent's position at trial was that The Uniform Child 
Support Schedule was intended to have a ceiling, beyond which 
point, an increase in the supporting parent's income will not 
increase the amount awarded as child support. Dr. Johnson's 
income for 1986 was $190,580.00, (see Defendant's answers to 
Plaintiff's interrogatories, and Tr. pp. 46-49) which amount was 
not on the Uniform Child Support Schedule because the schedule 
does not extend beyond a $120,000.00 annual parental income. The 
Trial Court held that "the maximum income figure used for child 
support pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Schedule of 
$10,000.00 per month recognizes that even though a father's 
income may be higher, the cost of raising and supporting said 
children locally will not increase although the father's income 
may exceed the $10,000.00 per month figure." (Findings of Fact 
No. 27, see also, Memorandum Decision No. 5). 
The trial court awarded $648.00 per month per child for each 
of the parties three children because the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule stops at an annual income level of $120,000.00. 
According to Appellant, if the Schedule would have been extended 
according to the rates used in the Schedule, the amount payable 
as child support would have been $1,047.00 per month per child 
for each of the parties three children. (Tr. p. 12). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Appellant believes that a medical license should be 
considered as property subject to division between spouses, in 
spite of the Court of Appeals decision in Peterson v. Peterson, 
58 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, (Ct. App. 1987), and wishes to raise the 
issue in the event that the matter goes to the Supreme Court of 
Utah. 
POINT II. Appellant contends that the method of valuation by 
which the trial court determined the worth of the Respondent's 
medical practice was not a fair representation of the true value 
of the practice because the trial court used the dissolution 
agreement between the doctor members of Associates of Pathology 
to determine the value of an on-going practice. Mrs. Johnson was 
not a party to the buy-out agreement between the doctors. 
POINT III. Appellant contends that the trial court erred 
by basing its award of alimony upon a projected future income of 
Dr. Johnson which was substantially below the doctor's income 
level of the previous five years. 
POINT IV. Appellant contends that the trial court's award of 
$1,000.00 per month alimony for 120 months is inadequate, and, 
considering the factors used by the Utah courts, and recent 
awards by other Utah courts in similar situations, it is far from 
being a reasonable award in view of the fact that the wife had 
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not worked for over 17 years, that she had no outside income, her 
standard of living, her needs, and the fact that the husband's 
1986 income was more than $190,000.00. 
POINT V. Appellant would argue that the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule, relied upon by the trial court in determining the 
amount of child support, was not intended to put a ceiling, upon 
all child support payable, but should continue at the same 
percentage rates until the figures are in line with the income of 
the father. 
POINT VI. Appellant contends that she is entitled to an 
equitable interest in Respondent's post-separation, pre-divorce 
income. Appellant should not be penalized for the time in which 
the parties were separated by being refused one half of the 
Respondent's income during that time. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE 
INTEREST IN RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL LICENSE 
Following trial of this case at the District Court, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, in the case of Peterson v. Peterson, 58 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 28, (Ct. App. 1987), held that a medical degree or 
license is not property subject to division between spouses. 
Because the same issue was relied upon by the Appellant in this 
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case, and because the issue has not as yet been heard by the 
Supreme Court of Utah, the Appellant herein raises the issue in 
the event that it reaches the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Appellant's experts valued Respondent's medical degree and 
or license at $1,156,426.00. Briefly, the value was calculated 
by subtracting the average income of a college graduate at age 44 
in 1987, from the annual income of the average pathologist at age 
44, in 1987. The average pathologist works until the age of 62. 
According to the national average for pathologists, Dr. Johnson 
has a worklife expectancy of 18 years. The difference in the 
income of the average pathologist, less the income of the average 
college graduate, multiplied by 18 and reduced to a present day 
value equals $1,156,426.00. (See Exhibit 8-P entitled "Summary 
of Valuation Methods"). 
According to Appellant's experts, Dr. Johnson makes 
$6,437.00 per month more than the average college graduate, and 
$2,785.00 per month more than the average pathologist in the 
United States. Appellant's experts claim that Dr. Johnson's 
association with Associates of Pathology is the reason that he 
makes more than the average pathologist of his age. Appellant 
contends that the medical degree or license has value and that it 
should be considered as a property interest to be divided between 
the spouses. 
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POINT II 
THE VALUATION METHOD EMPLOYED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE RESPONDENT'S 
MEDICAL PRACTICE DID NOT LEAD TO A FAIR ASSESSMENT 
OF THE VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S ON-GOING MEDICAL PRACTICE. 
At trial, the judge awarded Mrs. Johnson one half of the 
value of Respondent's medical practice, with this portion of the 
trial court's decision the Appellant has no argument. However, 
the trial court based the value of the Respondent's portion of 
the medical practice upon a dissolution agreement entered into by 
the members of Associates of Pathology. By adopting this method 
of valuation, Appellant argues that the court abused its 
discretion. The net effect of the trial court's adoption of 
Respondent's method of valuation, was to take Appellant's fifty 
percent interest in her husband's on-going medical practice from 
an estimated value of $77,498.50, according to the Appellant's 
experts, to an estimated value of $7,260.50 according the buy-out 
agreement formula. 
The buy-out agreement of Associates of Pathology, adopted by 
the trial court in determining the value of Respondent's portion 
of the association, provides a formula by which an associate's 
portion of the professional corporation is determined for 
purposes of reaching a pay-off figure in the event that a partner 
leaves the association, or dies. The value of Dr. Johnson's 
portion of Associates of Pathology, according to this method, as 
adopted by the trial court was $14,521.00, of which Mrs. Johnson 
was awarded 50 percent, or $7,260.50. 
Essentially, the buy-out agreement states that in the event 
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a member of Associates of Pathology leaves the corporation or 
dies, the value of the equipment, cash on hand, and the accounts 
receivable are totalled and the resulting figure constitutes the 
worth of the departing member's portion of the association, which 
he or his heirs is entitled to receive upon disassociation with 
the other doctors. 
The Appellant argued at trial that the Respondent's portion 
of Associates of Pathology, should be valued as an ongoing 
concern, rather than as a close-out, because Dr. Johnson did not, 
nor is he planning, to leave the association. On the contrary, 
he is probably going to work within the association until he 
retires, barring some unforseen event. 
According to the method of valuation used by Appellant's 
experts, the Respondent's portion of the association, valued as a 
going concern, was approximately $154,997.00. At trial, 
Respondent offered no evidence to refute the Appellant's 
valuation of Dr. Johnson's portion of Associates of Pathology as 
an on-going enterprise, but argued only that the value of the 
doctor's portion of the corporation should be computed according 
to the corporation's buy-out agreement. 
To summarize Appellant's argument, the Respondent's portion 
is worth far more than the value of his medical equipment, 
accounts receivable, and the cash on hand at a fixed time. The 
method employed by the trial court in assessing the value of Dr. 
Johnson's interest in Associates of Pathology, fails to consider 
good-will, and the fact that the enterprise is an on-going 
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concern that will continue to produce income until Dr. Johnson 
either retires or dies. At age 44, Dr. Johnson has 21 years 
until he reaches age 65, and 18 years until he reaches age 62, 
the age at which the average pathologist in the United States 
retires. The trial court has clearly abused its discretion by 
failing to consider Dr. Johnson's interest in Associates of 
Pathology as an on-going concern. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BASING ITS AWARD OF 
ALIMONY UPON A PROJECTED FUTURE INCOME WHICH 
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW DR. JOHNSON'S INCOME 
IN EACH OF THE PRECEDING FIVE YEARS. 
In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, at No. 5, the 
court found that Dr. Johnson's annual income was approximately 
$130,000.00 to $155,000.00. At trial, the Appellant offered 
evidence that Respondent's pension plan should also be counted as 
income, because even though money put into the pension plan will 
not be included as income for tax purposes, the money is 
discretionary income and should be included as part of the 
doctor's annual income. (Tr. at pp. 206-207). Doctor Johnson 
put $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 into a pension plan every year. 
From the trial court's findings of fact, it appears as if the 
court did not include that amount as part of Dr. Johnson's annual 
income. 
Dr. Johnson had annual incomes for the past five years as 
indicated in Dr. Jonnson's answers to interrogatories. The 
following figures represent Dr. Johnson's income for the past 
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five years: 1982 
Wages $54,000.00 
Dividends, interest, and bonds $11,606.00 
Bonus $51,500.0 0 
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$25,000.00 * 
Total 1982 income $142,106.00 
1983 
Wages $54,000.00 
Dividends, interest, and bonds $13,257.00 
Bonus $66,560.0 0 
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 * 
Total 1983 income $163,817.00 
1984 
Wages $60,000.00 
Dividends, interest, and bonds $15,967.00 
Bonus $93,500.00 
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 * 
Total 1984 income $199,467.00 
1985 
Wages $60,000.00 
Dividends, interest, and bonds $17,152.00 
Bonus $72,980.0 0 
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 * 
Total 1985 income $180,132.00 
1986 
Wages $69,000.00 
Dividends, interest, and bonds $10,000.00 
Bonus $81, 580. 00 
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 * 
Total 1982 income $190,580.00 
* The amounts contributed to the profit sharing plan, and the 
pension plan were disputed. However, the figures were included 
in Appellant's total income figures. 
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by undervaluing the income of Dr. Johnson for purposes 
of awarding alimony and child support. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY IS INSUFFICIENT 
AND AN ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION CONSIDERING THE 
FINANCIAL CONDITION AND NEEDS OF MRS. JOHNSON, 
THE ABILITY OF MRS. JOHNSON TO PRODUCE A SUFFICIENT 
INCOME FOR HERSELF, AND THE INCOME OF DR. JOHNSON. 
A. The Court of Appeals has the authority to fashion its own 
remedy as a substitution for that of the trial court. 
In the case of Berry v. Berry, 635 P. 2d 68 (Utah 1981), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that, 
"There is no fixed formula which a trial judge 
in a divorce action must follow in making 
divisions of properties, but it is the 
prerogative of the Court to make whatever 
disposition it deems fair, equitable, and 
necessary for the protection and welfare of 
the parties." Id., at 69. 
The Appellate Court will not disturb a trial court's 
Findings and Judgment merely because it views a matter 
differently, but would do so only if it appeared that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's 
findings, or that the trial court misapplied the law, or abused 
its discretion, so that an injustice has resulted. It is the 
trial court's duty to divide the property and income in a divorce 
proceeding so that the parties may readjust their lives to the 
new situation as well as possible, but there is no fixed rule or 
formula for the distribution of a marital estate. Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982). 
However, it is the duty and prerogative of the Court of 
Appeals, in equity matters where the occasion warrants, and after 
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a review of both the facts and the law, to fashion its own remedy 
as a substitution for the judgment of the trial court. Penrose 
v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1982). 
B. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider 
the value of Dr. Johnson's medical degree when awarding 
alimony. 
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it failed to consider the value of the husband's medical 
degree when it awarded alimony to the wife. 
In the recent case of Peterson v. Peterson, 58 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court, while refusing to term the 
husband's medical degree as "marital property1' for purposes of 
a division of assets, the court did take into account the value 
of the degree in the form of alimony. In Peterson, the trial 
court held that the husband's medical degree had a present value 
of $120,000.00, and therefore gave the wife $1,000.00 per month 
for 120 months in addition to a $1,000.00 per month alimony 
award. In the present case, the trial court held that the Dr. 
Johnson's medical degree has no value as divisible marital 
property, and gave the wife only $1,000.00 per month as alimony, 
not taking into consideration the value of the husband's medical 
degree. 
In Peterson, the trial court found that the husband was 
capable of making $100,000.00 per year, and alimony in the amount 
of $1,000.00 per month was awarded on that basis. Additionally, 
the trial court held that the husband's medical degree had a 
present day value of $120,000.00 and awarded the wife that amount 
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in monthly installments of $1,000.00 for 120 months. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held in Peterson, that 
the husband's medical degree was improperly valued as marital 
property by the trial court, but upheld the award of $120,000.00 
by granting the value of the medical license to the wife in the 
form of alimony. In the present case the husband made over 
$190,000.00 in 1986, based upon that figure alone, the trial 
court awarded the wife $1,000.00 per month alimony. 
In Peterson the Court discussed the factors to be used in 
determining a reasonable amount of alimony. Those factors, taken 
from the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), are: 
(1) the financial condition and needs of the wife; 
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself; 
(3) the ability of the husband to provide support. 
Id. at 1075. 
In discussing the third factor, the Court in Peterson stated: 
This is the proper realm in which to consider 
advanced degrees or professional licenses. An 
advanced degree is ordinarily an indicator of 
potential future earnings. In addition, the 
attainment of a degree by one spouse often 
results in a disparity of income that is likely 
to last for a great time, particularly in cases 
like the present one. Dr. Peterson has a history 
of earning more than $100,000.00 a year and Mrs. 
Peterson has not worked for the past fifteen. 
But it is the discrepancy of their earning power 
which is the basis for alimony, not the discrepancy 
of their educations. There is no logical reason, 
for example, for treating differently a self-trained 
artist without formal education who earns and will 
earn $100,000.00 a year and a doctor with a medical 
degree who earns and will earn $100,000.00 a year. 
Peterson, Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. 
In Peterson, while the Court did not award a monetary value to 
the husband's medical degree in the form of marital property, the 
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degree was considered, and the Court of Appeals reflected the 
value of the medical degree in the form of an alimony award. 
In the present case the trial court failed to attach a value 
to the husband's medical degree when it awarded the alimony. In 
this case, even though the husband makes almost twice as much as 
the husband in Peterson, the alimony awarded was exactly one half 
of that awarded in Peterson. That fact alone is good reason to 
believe there has been an abuse of discretion, but in addition to 
granting an unreasonably low alimony award based upon the 
husband's annual income, the trial court did not even consider 
the potential earning capacity of the Respondent because of his 
medical degree. 
C. The alimony awarded to Mrs. Johnson by the trial court 
is insufficient to maintain her present standard of living. 
In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951), the 
Court held that where there are sufficient assets and income to 
do so, a wife against whom a divorce decree has been entered is 
entitled to be provided for according to her station in life and 
as demanded by her condition of health and lack of ability to 
work. The facts in the present case are that Mrs. Johnson, who 
has devoted the past seventeen years of her life to the rearing 
of Mr. Johnson's children, and supporting Mr. Johnson while he 
attended Medical school, has forgone career opportunities in 
which she could have used her bachelor of arts degree in business 
administration to conceivably advance a career considerably. 
Mrs. Johnson is entitled to be provided for according to her 
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station in life. As a doctor's wife, Mrs. Johnson has led a life 
of extensive travel, and her social involvement has required that 
she maintain a certain level of respect and dignity among her 
peers. To force Mrs. Johnson to lower her standard of living in 
order to meet the needs of her position would run contrary to the 
intent for which alimony is provided. 
In Bushell v. Bushell, 649, P.2d 85 (Utah 1983), where the 
ex-wife testified at trial that she needed alimony to repair the 
roof on her home, to pay the utilities, and to obtain additional 
training so that she could secure a job which pays adequately. 
The court considered her financial conditions and needs and 
reiterated the rule set forth in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144 
(Utah 1978), which is that: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide support 
for a wife as nearly as possible at the standard 
of living she enjoyed during marriage and to 
prevent her from becoming a public charge. 
Id., at 147. 
The trial court appears to have disregarded the observation 
of the court in Gramme that alimony is not a reward, nor a 
penalty, because it is a post-marital duty of support and 
maintenance. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 
1980). In MacDonald, Defendant made the argument that: 
she was entitled to be provided for according 
to her station in life and as demanded by her 
condition of health and lack of ability to work; 
that she should not be cast aside in her helpless 
condition to 'sink or swim' or depend of others." 
The court agreed with the argument and added that this was 
part of the continuing responsibility of the marriage covenant: 
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" . . . in sickness, in health; for better of worse " This 
promise cannot be entirely avoided, even by divorce. In the 
present case it appears that Defendant is expected to do just 
what the court in MacDonald was trying to avoid, "sink or swim". 
The court found in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 
1983), that an award of only $100.00 per month alimony was an 
abuse of discretion because it would not afford the wife a 
standard of living close to the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties during the marriage. The Higley case involved a thirty 
year marriage and the husband's gross income was $23,356.80 per 
year. The court found that the husband had the ability to 
provide permanent support in an amount greater than $100.00 per 
month. 
The Court observed in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144 (Utah 
1978), that: 
the purpose of alimony is to provide 
post-marital support; it is intended neither 
as a penalty imposed on the husband nor as 
a reward granted to the wife. Its function 
is to provide support for the wife as nearly 
as possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage to prevent her 
from becoming a public charge. Important 
criteria in delivering a reasonable award 
for support and maintenance are the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife, considering 
her station in life; her ability to produce 
sufficient income for herself; and the ability 
of the husband to provide support. Id.., at 147. 
In addition to providing support for the wife as nearly as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, 
the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d 
21 
564 (1985), in further describing the purpose of alimony stated; 
An alimony award should, as far as possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close 
as possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. Id., at 566, emphasis added. 
In the present case, because the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to award reasonable alimony, Mrs. Johnson 
will be deprived of her ability to live in the manner she was 
accustomed to and will be precluded from other luxuries that were 
the culmination of the parties' joint efforts over the 21 years 
of their marriage. It is the responsibility of the trial court 
to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their 
economic resources so that the parties might reconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basis. Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 
697 (Utah 1974). In a dissolution of the marriage of a 
substantial duration, the objective is that the parties separate 
on as equal a basis as possible. The Utah Court of Appeals in 
Peterson, the most recent Utah case on alimony, quoted from 
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court in 
Savage stated: 
Where a marriage is of long duration and the 
earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds 
that of the other, as here, it is appropriate 
to order alimony and child support at a level 
which will ensure that the supported spouse and 
children may maintain a standard of living not 
unduly disproportionate to that which they would 
have enjoyed had the marriage continued. Id.., at 
1205. 
In the present case the Appellant is left with no means of 
income other than alimony, and that alimony is $1,000.00. On the 
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other hand, according to Respondent's answers to Appellant's 
interrogatories, Respondent had a gross income in 1986 of 
$190,580.00, or a gross monthly income of $15,881.66. To award 
the Appellant a mere $1,000.00 per month alimony, in view of the 
Respondent's income is an obvious abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
D. The trial court failed to consider all of the factors 
required by the Utah Supreme Court in determining alimony. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (1985), the Court recited the three factors that must be 
considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife: 
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
(3) the ability of the husband to provide 
support. Id., at 1075. 
The Court in Jones, held that because the trial court, had failed 
to apply the three factors used in determining alimony, it had 
abused its discretion. The Utah Supreme Court in Jones stated: 
Nowhere in the trial court's memorandum 
decision, its findings of fact, or its 
statements made on the record at the 
conclusion of the hearing is there any 
indication that the court analyzed the 
circumstances of the parties in light of 
these three factors. And our attempt to 
perform this analysis through a review of 
the record evidence compels us to conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion 
in fixing alimony award. Id. 
In the case at hand, there is no reference in the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision, or Findings of Fact, that the three 
factors described in Jones, were considered in fixing an alimony 
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award. The only factor that appears to have been considered by 
the trial court in determining the amount of alimony was the 
third factor, "the ability of the husband to provide support". 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Olson v. Olson, 704 
P.2d 564, (1985), held that the trial court abused its discretion 
in awarding alimony where "the record contains only scant 
indication... of the court's consideration of the first of the 
three factors, the financial condition and the needs of the 
wife.... In the present case, the trial court made no references 
to any of the three factors mentioned in Jones, but only 
discussed the Mr. Johnson's ability to provide support. 
According to the precedence set by the courts of appeal in Utah, 
the decision of the trial court in this case must be reversed for 
the court's failure to consider all three of the factors required 
for a proper determination of an alimony award. 
In light of the unreasonably small award of alimony and the 
case law, it is evident that the trial court abused its 
discretion and in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded 
to Appellant, due to the fact that the Factors to be considered 
in determining alimony as set forth in Jones v. Jones, were not 
adhered to as required by the Utah Supreme Court. 
E. The trial court's award of alimony is substantially below the 
rate at which other Utah courts have awarded spouses in 
similar situations. 
Appellant is aware that the trial court has a reasonable 
amount of latitude within which it may make its decisions as to 
the proper amount of alimony, and Appellant respects that 
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necessary degree of discretion which has been given to the 
district courts. However, a brief review of some recent Utah 
alimony awards in which the parties are similarly situated, 
quickly reveals the inequity that was done when the trial court 
in the present case awarded only $1,000.00 per month alimony to 
Mrs. Johnson. In the most recent case of Peterson v. Peterson, 
the parties were in much the same position as the parties in the 
present case. Both of the Husbands are medical doctors, in 
Peterson, the parties had been married 20 years when they filed 
for divorce, and they had six children. In the present case, the 
Johnsons have been married 21 years, with three children. In 
Peterson, Dr. Peterson was found to have an annual income of 
about $100,000.00 per year. In the present case, Dr. Johnson has 
an annual income of almost double that of Dr. Peterson, he made 
over $190,000.00 in 1986. However, in spite of the fact that Dr. 
Peterson makes only roughly one half of Dr. Johnson's salary, he 
pays $2,000.00 per month alimony to Dr. Johnsons $1,000.00. 
While Dr. Peterson's monthly alimony payment is roughly 24 
percent of his monthly income, Dr. Johnson's monthly alimony 
payment is about six percent of his monthly income, when a figure 
of $190,000.00 is used as the annual income. 
In other cases, where the husband's income is in the general 
range of that of Dr. Johnson, the courts have generally awarded 
much more substantial alimony awards. In the case of Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
an award of $2,000.00 per month alimony to a wife who's husband 
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had an annual income of $133,370.00. In that case, the parties 
had three children, and had been married for 20 years. The 
alimony in Savage, was approximately 18 percent of the monthly 
income of the husband. 
Another case of value in assessing the compatibility of the 
alimony award in the present case with that of other similarly 
situated parties is the case of Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 
406, (Utah 1983). In Yelderman, the husband was a medical 
doctor, the parties had been married for about 25 years, and had 
six children. Dr. Yelderman earned in excess of $100,000.00 
annually. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an 
alimony award of $2,500.00 per month where Dr. Yelderman had an 
annual income of over $100,000.00. Even if we use the figure of 
$120,000.00 for Dr. Yelderman's annual income, alimony paid by 
Dr. Yelderman is 25 percent of his monthly income, again far 
above the percent that Dr. Johnson pays, which is six percent of 
his monthly income. 
The average of the awards of alimony in the cases of 
Peterson, Savage, and Yelderman, figured as a percent of the 
husband's monthly income was 22.3 3 percent. iMrs. Johnson was is 
awarded approximately 6 percent of Dr. Johnson's monthly income. 
In this case, the trial court's award is approximately 73 percent 
below the average of the three cases mentioned above. Clearly, 
such an award is an abuse of the trial court's discretion, in 
view of the circumstances of this case, and should be modified to 
reflect a more equitable figure. 
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F. The fact that Mrs. Johnson was awarded 50 percent of the 
marital assets does not decrease her need for more 
aTimony since the assets which she received as a result 
of the property distribution do not produce income. 
The parties reached an agreement as to distribution of their 
marital assets. A breakdown of the division of assets is 
included in the document entitled "proposal for Settlement", 
dated 1/20/87. The assets which Mrs. Johnson received are the 
following: 
House $130,000.00 
Cars llf000.00 
Cabin 10,000.00 
Boat 11,000.00 
Furniture 12,000.00 
1/2 of cash 42,602.00 
1/2 of stock 18,644.00 
cash for A of P ins. & stock 9,309.00 
Share of pension trust 228,372.00* 
$472,927.00** 
* The figure of $183,950.00 that was included in 
the original Exhibit was adjusted to include 
interest and deposits until April 1, of 1987, 
the day in which the financial distribution was 
made. 
** This new total includes the adjustment made 
to Mrs. Johnson's Share of the Pension Trust. 
Appellant contends that the assets listed above should not 
be considered as payment in lieu of alimony because these assets 
cannot be used to maintain Mrs. Johnson on a day to day basis 
without depleting her capital assets. On the other hand, Dr. 
Johnson has a continual income and a steady flow of cash with 
which to put himself back in the position he was in before the 
divorce. 
Mrs. Johnson should be granted additional alimony so that 
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she can live at her present standard of living without the need 
to liquidate her assets in order to provide for her month to 
month needs. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
HELD THAT THE UNIFORM CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE, 
WHICH IT RELIED UPON IN DETERMINING CHILD 
SUPPORT, SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO CONSIDER 
ANNUAL INCOME LEVELS BEYOND $120,000.00. 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, devoted a 
rather lengthy portion of that document to a discussion of the 
reasoning behind its interpretation of the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule to intentionally cut off consideration of a supporting 
parent's annual income beyond the $120,000.00 level. The trial 
court stated: 
5. The parties' stipulation reserves the 
issue of child support. The Court finds 
that the following of the child support 
table's last line, that is for approximately 
$120,000 per year, is proper. The Court 
recognizes that the father's earnings likely 
exceed that figure by $10,000 to $25,000 per 
year. The exact income is deemed by the Court 
to be immaterial. The Court's reasoning on 
this matter is set out below. 
This Judge wrote the first child support 
guidelines in Utah. He also served on the 
Utah Judicial Council when the first statewide 
guidelines were adopted. The issue of how 
high child support guidelines should go is 
a matter of considerable debate. It may be 
helpful to examine a somewhat similar case. 
That case concerns a multi-millionaire's 
divorce in Clearfield, Utah. The children 
were left with the mother in the family home, 
and everyone planned sic the children would 
remain in the public schools and continue to 
enjoy their friends and association in the 
middle class neighborhood. This is very 
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similar to the case at hand. The calculations 
begin with the consideration of foodstuffs. 
Milkf eggsf bread and vegetables, etc., cost 
rich child close to the same as it costs a 
middle class child. A rich child, by and 
large, wears the same fashions as his peers. 
The recreation is principally shared with 
persons of his own age group. There are some 
trips expected that will be taken with 
grandparents, father, and occasionally with the 
mother, that may be considered more exotic. 
Doctors and dentists charge rich children and 
middle class children a fixed rate. The bottom 
line, arithmetically, was that once a child's 
father gets to the $10,000.00 a month level, and a 
child is raised locally, there is no effect on 
sums spent actually rearing the child when the 
father's income increases. One runs into a problem 
similar to "Brewster's Millions". The Davis County 
millionaire was the product of generations of rich 
men, and their efforts to adjust. He concluded 
that to give a child more than one and one-half 
times the neighboring kids' allowance is to buy 
your child problems. An analysis of the monthly 
budget of this couple while they lived together, 
and since the separation, supports the hypothesis 
that prudence does not indicate that anymore sic 
should be spent on child support in the future than 
was spent on the child care while the father lived 
at home. This couple actually spent less while the 
father lived in the home than is indicated in the 
child support guidelines in the tables. It is 
not the purpose of child support to provide savings 
and/or estates. Savings and estates are matters 
that are controlled by the parents and involve 
other considerations. 
The trial court acknowledged in the preceding discussion 
that, "the issue of how high child support should go is a matter 
of considerable debate." While the Appellant has the utmost 
respect for the opinion of the trial court on the issue, the 
Appellant's takes an opposing position from that of the trial 
court. 
The weakness of the trial court's theory, that the Uniform 
Child Support Schedule was intentionally capped at an income 
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level of $120,000.00, is that if such an argument truly were the 
case, the trial court's analysis fails to answer two questions: 
(1) why does the schedule increase according to the income of the 
supporting parent, and; (2) why was the annual income figure of 
$120,000.00 chosen as the cut-off point? 
If, as the trial court has supposed, a rich child can live 
for about the same amount as a middle class child, then why does 
the Schedule reflect any increase in child support payments in 
conjunction with the supporting parent's income? The logical 
point at which the trial court's theory ends is that all children 
can live for a certain established amount if the only 
considerations are the price of food, and generic clothing, as 
determined by a sort of breadbasket list of items, the price of 
which will change according to the economic situation. 
If the purpose of the Schedule were to support a child at a 
certain minimum standard, the support payments would not increase 
with the parent's income as in the present Schedule. 
In contrast to the trial court's theory of the Schedule, it 
appears that the Schedule increases according to the parent's 
income for a very simple reason, the same reason that alimony is 
more for a wife married to a rich man than it is for a woman 
married to a poor man, because the purpose of alimony is to 
maintain a standard of living as near as possible to that enjoyed 
prior to the divorce, and to keep the child in the same lifestyle 
as that enjoyed before the divorce. If the child of a 
Rockefeller is forced to live on the same amount of child support 
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as a child of a person making $120,000.00 per year, the child 
could conceivably be forced to make a drastic change in his or 
her standard of living. If Appellant accepts the trial court's 
assumption that "a rich child, by and large, wears the same 
fashions as his peers," and the child has rich children as peers, 
the child may have to change his or her standard of living if the 
amount of child support is not commensurate with past standards 
of living. Child support consists of much more than buying 
"milk, eggs, bread, and vegetables...." Housing costs are more 
in upper middle class neighborhoods. If the mother is forced to 
move out of the neighborhood because she cannot afford to 
continue to support the children in the manner they are 
accustomed to, then the child could suffer. 
The trial court stated that it based its conclusions upon 
the assumption that the child was to continue to live in Utah, in 
a middle class neighborhood, and attend public schools. Even if 
the child continued to live in Utah, he or she child would be 
denied many opportunities that were present before the divorce. 
The child may be denied the opportunities of music lessons, 
travel abroad, private schools, tutors etc., that more income can 
provide. 
Parents work for a higher income so that they can enjoy what 
that income provides, for their children, as well as themselves. 
To say that child support beyond a certain level is unnecessary, 
is clearly denying the child his or her right to the 
opportunities made possible by the effort their parents made to 
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advance themselves, and their family. 
Appellant finally contends that it is an abuse of discretion 
to rely solely upon the Uniform Child Support Schedule in 
determining a proper amount of child support. The schedule 
should be used only as a guideline, and should not have the 
effect of excluding input, or limiting the discretion of the 
trial court. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO FIFTY PERCENT OF 
RESPONDENT'S INCOME DURING THE PERIOD THE 
COUPLE WAS SEPARATED, YET PRIOR TO DIVORCE. 
The parties separated on or about February 1, 1986. The 
trial for divorce was held at the end of March, 1987. 
Accordingly, Respondent had income of approximately 14 months 
during that time. On the other hand, Appellant had no income 
during that time other than what was paid to her by Respondent. 
Appellant's experts offered testimony at trial to the effect that 
Respondents ' s share of the post-separation income exceeded the 
Appellant's share by some $45,000.00. These calculations were 
made after taxes and all other considerations were taken into 
account. Appellant maintains she should be awarded an equitable 
interest in respondent's post-separation income as that income 
was an asset of the marriage and the parties agreed in the 
Stipulation that all assets of the marriage should be divided 
equally. 
It is Appellant's position that the trial court misapplied 
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Utah Law and made other substantial errors in its failure to 
award to appellant certain assets, alimony, and interest in other 
assets. Moreover, it is the Appellant's position that these 
issues are substantial and merit further proceedings and 
consideration by the Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appe l l an t , Mrs. Johnson bel ieves tha t the t r i a l court 
abused i t s d i sc re t ion when i t adopted Dr. Johnson ' s method of 
a s s e s s i n g t h e v a l u e of h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l 
corporat ion, Associates of Pathology, and tha t for purposes of 
a s s e s s i n g Mrs. J o h n s o n ' s share of the m a r i t a l a s s e t s , the 
i n t e r e s t of Dr. Johnson in the associa t ion should be reassessed 
as an on-going concern. 
A p p e l l a n t r e q u e s t s t h a t This Court review the f i g u r e s 
contained in t h i s br ief , and in the t r i a l court record, and award 
an alimony amount t h a t i s r e a s o n a b l e , and in l ine with other 
persons s imi la r ly s i tua ted considering the length of mar r i age , 
t he income of Dr. Johnson, the number of c h i l d r e n , and Mrs. 
Johnson ' s a b i l i t y t o suppor t h e r s e l f a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e . 
Appellant a lso ask tha t This Court remove the l imi t of ten years 
for the payment of alimony. 
A p p e l l a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y 
in te rpre ted the in ten t of the Uniform Child Support Schedule to 
l i m i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of incomes of s u p p o r t i n g p a r e n t s to 
33 
$120,000.00 per year incomes and below. Appellant asks that This 
Court award child support to the children of Dr. Johnson at an 
amount commensurate with Dr. Johnson's income, unlimited by the 
arbitrary limitations imposed by the fact that the Schedule stops 
at an annual income of $120,000.00. 
Appellant believes that she is entitled to a fair portion of 
the income earned by Dr. Johnson between the time of separation 
and Divorce. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached. 
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TIM W. HEALY, #7606 
Attorney for Defendant 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2630 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, ^ 
Plaintiff, . 
vs. 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, ' 
Defendant. , 
1
 FINDINGS OF FACT and 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94737 
The above entitled matter came before the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding for trial on 
the 20th day of March 1987 and again on the 23rd day of March 
1987; plaintiff was present represented by her counsel, Stephen 
W. Farr, Esq; defendant was present represented by his 
counsel, Tim W. Healy, Esq. A stipulation of the parties 
regarding the division of real and personal property was 
read and acknowledged by the parties. Various witnesses 
were sworn and testified and various items of documentary 
evidence were received. Counsel for the respective parties 
met again with the Court on April 22, 1987 for the purpose 
of clarifying some items from the Memorandum Decision 
and the Court being duly advised in the premises now 
enters the following: 
/ FINDINGS OF FACT 
'A. That the Court has jurisdiction in this matter inasmuch 
as both parties are actual and bona fide residents of 
Weber/County, Utah. 
2. That the parties were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah on August 19, 1966. They separated on or about 
February 1, 1986. Each party is now requesting a divorce. 
JOHNSON v JOHNSON 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Page Two 
4/3. That three children have been born as issue of 
the marriage, to-wit: Erik Val Johnson, born October 30, 
1970; Jennifer Johnson, born January 22, 1973 and Jamie Anne 
Johnson, born November 30, 1978. 
That both parties have caused the other party pain 
and anguish to such an extent that they are unable to continue 
in the marital relationship with the other. Plaintiff's 
cruelty was that she did not make a reasonable effort to 
keep the romance alive and she gave priority to her church 
work, children and personal interests and has caused her 
husband, the defendant, to feel isolated and unappreciated 
•
//5. Plaintiff attempted marriage counselling approximately 
five years ago. Defendant attempted to revive this counselling 
in 1985 but plaintiff took no interest in that effort. 
*/6. Defendant's cruelty consisted of having developed a 
secret remance which plaintiff eventually discovered and she 
filed for separate maintenance. Defendant counterclaimed for 
divorce. Plaintiff has expressed a desire to continue the 
marriage but does not plan any personal behavioral changes 
toward the defendant. Plaintiff testified that defendant 
plans to continue his relationship with another woman. 
Si. Pla intiff did obtain a college degree in business from 
Weber State College prior to her marriage to defendant. 
/€. That at the time of the marriage of the parties, defendant 
had obtained his bachelor's degree and had completed one 
year of medical school. 
i/9. That plaintiff worked for approximately three years 
following the marriage of the parties but has not worked in the 
ensuing 17 years. Defendant also worked part-time for 
two of the three years he was in medical school after the 
parties were married. 
fclO• That defendant's parents paid all of the expenses 
for defendant's tuition and books during the time that he was 
in medical school. 
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v^ Tl • That defendant had a limited fellowship during 
medical school which was a credit upon his tuition costs. 
That defendant would have achieved a medical 
degree with or without the plaintiff's limited contribution. 
^Jr3. That plaintiff has enjoyed the benefits and 
fruits of defendant's medical degree for a substantial 
period of time. 
i/13. That the articles of incorporation of defendant's 
employer, The Associates of Pathology, are actually little 
more than a partnership at will. 
*
/l4. That the buy-out agreement fixed the buy-out figure 
as a proportional share of fixed assets. 
t/\5. That there is no fixed contract of employment 
with the hospitals served by the aforesaid corporation; it is 
a going rate situation. 
fl6. That each doctor within the aforesaid professional 
corporation bills the hospital and/or the other clients 
for services rendered and the money is eventually divided 
equally. 
That the jnarket place has provided substitute or 
new doctors. New doctors come in substantially in the 
same position as the doctors leaving said corporation. The 
rates charged by each pathologist are identical to the* 
others and there is no specific reward for seniority or length 
of service. 
t/18. That the value of defendant's interest in the 
Associates of Pathology , a professional corporation, is 
$14,521.00. 
•19. That one of the flaws in plaintiff's calculation of 
the value of defendant's medical degree is the assumption 
that the defendant's income would increase each year by a 
fixed percentage. 
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t/20. That the basic income of defendant in his employment 
with the Associates of Pathology will equal the normal charges 
for piece work done by the pathologist at the direction of the 
various hospitals and other clients. There is no evidence 
that the pay for this piecemeal service will increase; in 
fact, the evidence is that it will lessen. There is also 
no evidence that the amount of piece work will increase or 
that the number o«f doctors sharing the earnings from 
the Associates of Pathology will decrease. 
^ 21?*/That the earnings of the defendant has levelled off 
/afthe present rate for the expected future. The projected 
J/income for the defendant for 1987 including sfllft^ y *r\c\ 
bonus is between $127,000 and $132,000 which income level 
J.s pyppH^ri i-n ramain ^ncf^nt in the ensuing fpw y^ars.— 
!2. That the income of the defendant as well as the 
other pathologists within the Associates of Pathology is 
expected to be set by the fair market place in the future. 
The rates charged by each pathologist are identical to the 
others and there is no specific reward for seniority or length 
of service, 
K &t jr 23^That the earnings of the defendant as well as 
r
* JU^ f ^*s f u t u r e potential have been considered by the Court for the 
purpose of fixj^ng^alimony. 
That each of the parties have employed their 
attorney and relied upon said attorney in good faith. 
./25. That each party has funds with which they may pay their 
own attorney. 
i/76. That the parties have acquired substantial real 
and personal property during the course of their marriage 
which should be equitably divided pursuant to the stipulation 
of the parties. 
y/27. That the maximum/figure used for child support 
pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Schedule of $10,000 per 
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ymonth recognizes that even though a father's income may be 
higher the cost of raising and supporting said children locally 
will not increase although the father's income may exceed the 
$10,00Q^per month figure. 
«-^ 28. That plaintiff and defendant actually spent less 
while defendant lived in the home for the support of the 
children of the parties than is indicated in the child 
support guidelines and the tables adopted by this judicial 
district based upon defendant's income. 
. / 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
rl. That plaintiff and defendant should each be awarded 
a decree of divorce from the other upon the grounds of 
mental cruelty the same to become final upon signing and 
entryy 
{A. That plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties subject to 
reasonable rights of visitation by defendant. 
t/3. That defendant should pay to plaintiff as and for 
child support the sum of $648.00 per month per child commencing 
with the month of April 1987. 
That plaintiff's expert witnesses lack credibility 
interest and 
regarding the values placed on defendantTs/stock with the 
Associates of Pathology and regarding the value of his 
medical degree. 
-^5. That defendant's expert witness has high credibility 
regarding the value of defendant's interest and stock in the 
Associates of Pathology as well as his earnings as a 
medical doctor. 
'lk 6. That defendant's medical degree should not be marital 
property subject to division by the Court in a divorce action;* 
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H 7. That defendant's earnings as well as his future potential 
have been considered by the Court for the purpose of fixing 
alimom 
tx6. That defendant should pay to plaintiff as and for 
alimony the sum of $1,000 per month commencing with the 
month of April 1987. Said alimony should be paid to 
plaintiff for a period of ten years or until plaintiff either 
remarries, cohabits with another male person or dies. ^ ///#?-& 
f/9. That plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the value 
in defendant's interest in the Associates of Pathology, 
a professional corporation which total interest is in the sum 
of $14,521.00. 
That plaintiff should be awarded the family home of 
the parties subject to assuming and discharging the outstanding 
mortgage balance thereon and holding the defendant harmless there-
from. 
That defendant should be entitled to claim the 
two oldest children of the parties for income tax purposes 
commencing in 1986. At such time as the oldest child of 
the parties reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school 
with his appropriate year group, whichever is later, that child 
support should be discontinued. Defendant should then be 
next 
entitled to claim the/oldest child of the parties for income 
tax purposes. At such time as just one child remains the 
defendant should be entitled to claim said child for income 
tax purposes every other year. 
*f2. That each of the parties should bear the expenses 
of their own expert witnesses as well as their own attorney 
fees and costs. 
That plaintiff should notbe entitled to any 
portion of defendants 1986 or 1987 bonus inasmuch as these are 
considered as part of defendant's overall annual income, provided, 
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however, that such portions of defendant's 1986 bonus as were 
previously allocated to the various savings and checking 
accounts of the parties and formed part of the stipulation 
of the parties should not be affected. 
*^4 . That defendant should be r e s p o n s i b l e for any and 
a l l f e d e r a l and s t a t e income t axes owed by him upon h i s 1986 
income. / ^ W < fotf ^ £&**' - #fyT* <$«F- /\Uc4*Cfa /fasc/ds^ fA]^ 
15. That the p a r t i e s Siould be awarded the fo l lowing tio^t^ rfovkjUik 
r e a l and pe r sona l p r o p e r t y wi th the v a l u e s i n d i c a t e d h e r e i n : -"" 
P l a i n t i f f 
House 
Cars 
Cabin 
Boat 
Furniture 
\ cash incl, $17,000 
in Amer. 1st 
\ stock 
Addt'l cash in lieu 
of AofP stock & life 
cash value 
Share of pension trust 
$ 96,000 ^ 
11,000 ^ 
10,000 ^ 
11,000 </ 
12,000 *S 
59,602 S 
18,644 ^ 
ins.
 y 
$" 
9,309^ 
200,950 ^ 
428,505 
Defendant 
Share of cash 
H stock 
FFCA-EF Hutton 
South Gate Lodge 
A of P stock 
Life Ins. cash value 
Loan to Dean 
Muni bonds MLPF&S & 
EF Hutton 
Pension trust share 
Car 
43,791 -i 
18,644 
10,000 
10,500 
14,521 
4,099 
900 
116,628 
203 ,421 
6,000 
, ncluding $20,000 in Continental Rank 
checking 
428*, 504 gyyj 3 7 J ^ gjj£^ ,c. *P 
The pension trust share of plaintiff & defendant as reflected 
above was calculated as of 3/31/86. The additional amounts in 
said pension trust share which have accrued as of 4/1/8? but which 
figures are not/bailable shall be equally divided between the 
parties and added to the pension shares of plaintiff & defendent 
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KA6 .6. That the accumulated amounts in the pension & 
profit sharing trusts for purposes of property division 
should be as of April 1, 1987. Both the plaintiff and the 
defendant should bear their own tax consequences from any 
draw from these sums. 
That the remaining items of personal property 
including but not limited to silverware, china and porcelain 
should be divided equally, traded against other items of 
similar value or purchased for cash for the value of the 
other party's interests. » r 
«^ i8. That the defendant should receive the pmotp , i 
equipment, the snow blower and the £tereo.) £U <~Tcf>l u .
 < 
lX9. That the plaintiff should be awarded the sewing 
machines, ATV 3 wheeler and the parties should also 
divide the Lennox china and the Lunt silverware or one 
party may buy out the other party for one-half of the said 
value. 
,^6. That the parties should sign such Quit Claim 
Deeds to real property as well as vehicle titles as may 
be required to effect transfer of the aforesaid real and 
personal property. 
21. That any amounts in the savings and checking lu*^ 
accounts cs well as ±ocks and bonds in excess of the amounts 
as shown in paragraph 15 above should be equally divided. 
22. That plaintiff's circumstances should not be 
considered to have changed for purposes of modifying 
alimony awarded herein so long as her earnings do not 
exceed M^O'jg&r month. 
DATED this day of MAY, 1987. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
• Case No. 94737 
Defense counsel is invited to submit findingsf 
conclusions, and decree consistent with that indicated below. If 
he has not done so within two weeks after receipt of this 
decision/ plaintiff1s counsel is invited to do so. 
FACTS 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the case because of 
the residency of both parties in Weber County. 
2. The parties were married in 1966f and separated in 
1986. Each party is now requesting a divorce. 
3. Each party has been cruel to the other. The 
plaintiff's cruelty is that she did not make a reasonable effort 
to keep the romance alive. She gave priority to her church work, 
children, and personal interests. This caused her husband to 
feel isolated and unappreciated. She attempted marriage 
counseling about five years ago. Her husband attempted to revive 
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this counseling in 1985f but the plaintiff took no interest in 
that effort. Defendant's solution to his problem is legally 
unacceptable. He developed a secret romance. The plaintiff 
eventually discovered the romance and filed for separate mainten-
ance. He counterclaimed for divorce. She has a desire to 
continue the marriage, but does not plan any personal behavior 
changes towards her husband. He now plans to continue with his 
new romance. The Court's conclusion is that each of the parties 
are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty. If 
the parties agreef the divorce may be final at once. 
4. The Court accepts the parties' stipulation so far as 
it goes, concerning child custody, visitation, and property 
division, etc., and rules on the remaining issues. If any issue 
is not here ruled on, or further guidance is needed, the Court is 
available for conference. 
5. The parties' stipulation reserves the issue of child 
support. The Court finds that the following of the child support 
table's last line, that is for approximately $120,000 per year, 
is proper. The Court recognizes that the father's earnings 
likely exceed that figure by $10,000 to $25,000 per year. The 
exact income is deemed by the Court to be immaterial. The 
Court's reasoning on this matter is set out below. 
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This Judge wrote the first child support guidelines in 
Utah. He also served on the Utah Judicial Council when the first 
statewide guidelines were adopted. The issue of how high child 
support guidelines should go is a matter of considerable debate. 
It may be helpful to examine a somewhat similar case. That case 
concerns a multi-millionaire's divorce in Clearfield, Utah. The 
children were left with the mother in the family home, and 
everyone planned the children would remain in the public schools 
and continue to enjoy their friends and association in the middle 
class neighborhood. This is very similar to the case at hand. 
The calculations begin with the consideration of foodstuffs. 
Milk, eggs, bread and vegetables, etc., cost a rich child close 
to the same as it costs a middle class child. A rich child, by 
and large, wears the same fashions as his peers. The recreation 
is principally shared with persons of his own age group. There 
are some trip? expected that will be taken with grandparents, 
father, and occasionally with the mother, that may be considered 
more exotic. Doctors and dentists charge rich children and 
middle class children a fixed rate. The bottom line, arithmatic-
ally, was that once a child's father gets to the $10,000 a month 
level, and a child is raised locally, there is no effect on sums 
spent actually rearing the child when the father's income 
increases. One runs into a problem similar to "Brewster's 
Millions". The Davis County millionaire was the product of 
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generations of rich men, and their efforts to adjust. He 
concluded that to give a child more than one and one-half times 
the neighboring kids1 allowance is to buy your child problems. 
An analysis of the monthly budget of this couple while they lived 
together, and since the separation, supports the hypothesis that 
prudence does not indicate that anymore should be spent on child 
support in the future than was spent on child care while the 
father lived at the home. This couple actually spent less while 
the father lived in the home than is indicated in the child 
support guidelines in the tables^ It is not the purpose of child 
support to provide savings and/or estates. Savings and estates 
are matters that are controlled by the parents and involve other 
considerations. 
6. The parties did not stipulate on whether or not the 
vJlQuse should be paid o^ fv The plaintiff should be allowed to 
chose whether to take the cash and the obligation and/or pay off 
the mortgage. There is sufficient equity in the home that there 
is little risk to the defendant. The subject f^ alimonyyis not 
covered by the stipulation, nor is the value of the medical 
doctor degree, nor the value of the defendant's position in the 
professional corporation. 
The plaintiff is awarded alimony at the rate of $1,000 
to be continued under the general terms of alimony, but not to 
exceed ten years. The Court's rationale in ruling on this matter 
is indicated below. 
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The plaintiff has enjoyed the benefits of this medical 
degree for a substantial period of the time. 
The plaintiff did not create this degree. Her contribu-
tion was a very limited financial one for three years and a few 
months that she worked at I.R. S. She earned about $14,000 during 
that time and shared it with the defendant. The defendant was 
well on his way to the medical degree before this marriage. He 
had achieved his undergraduate education and the degree that made 
his acceptance into medical school possible. He had been 
accepted into medical school. He had already completed one year 
before the marriage. He had the support of his parents. His 
parents continued to pay all of his tuition and book charges 
until the degree was obtained. He had a limited fellowship. He 
worked part time for two of the three years the couple lived 
together during medical school. The evidence indicates that the 
defendant would have achieved a medical degree with or without 
the plaintiff1s limited financial contribution. She married a 
medical student. She will further enjoy the fruits of his study 
in the future. She has received substantial sums of money that 
his training has provided in the property settlement. The child 
support here awarded reflects his higher earning capacity. ^ 
7. The stipulation does not cover ^f€torneysf fee^^or 
the cost of ef£e1rt witnessed Each party shall bear their own 
expenses in this matter. 
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Much of the tr ia l time has been concerned with the 
p l a i n t i f f 1 s a l legat ion of the present value of the medical degree 
and the stock exceeds a million dol lars and that he should pay 
her one-half. The p l a i n t i f f ' s expert witness1 testimony as to 
the value of the medical degree and/or the stock lacks 
cred ib i l i ty . 
First l e t usbe^-settce i ne d -w^Ui th e value of the stock 
posit ion in t h ^ professional corporationA There i s no fixed 
contract for employment winf~the hospitals . It i s a "going rate" 
s i tuat ion. Each doctor does equal work and gets equal pay 
regardless of the number of years he has spend with' the group. 
The ar t i c l e s of incorporation are actually l i t t l e more than a 
partnership at w i l l . The buy out agreement f ixes the buy out 
figure as a porportional share of the fixed asse t s . Each doctor 
b i l l s the hospital for each servicer and the money i s eventually 
s p l i t equally. One of the principal benefits of the business i s 
the arrangement makes i s possible for the corporation to pay into 
a retirement fund sums that/ in e f fec t , defer taxation. This 
accumulation of funds for the purpose of divis ion in th i s case 
shall be calculated as of the value indicated by the defendant's 
experts as of April 1, 1987. Both the p la in t i f f and the defen-
dant must bear their own tax consequences from any draw from 
these sums. The value of these deferred earnings i s as indicated 
by the defendants experts. The market place has 'provided 
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subst i tute or new doctors. The new doctors come in substantially 
in the same posit ion as the leaving doctors. This i s true of the 
manner in which th i s defendant was treated. There i s no indica-
tion in the immediate future that the earnings of these doctors 
w i l l exceed the simple value of a pathologist 's services on a 
piecemeal basis to the hospitals . 
8. \The value of the plainfcir£f^s expert w i t n e s s 
testimony as to the worth of the(^M.D. d e g r e e / i s not credible. 
One of his flaws i s the assumption_^Ka"t^a doctor's income wi l l 
(fincrease each year by a fixed percentage^ The basic income of 
t h i s group i s on the formula that cash received wi l l equal the 
normal charges for piece work done by the pathologist at the 
various hospi ta l ' s directions. Unless the rate charged for the 
piecemeal service i s increased, and there i s no evidence that i t 
w i l l be, in fact evidence i s that i t wi l l lessen, or the amount 
of piece work increases, and there i s no evidence that i t w i l l , 
or the number of doctors sharing the funds wi l l decrease, and 
there i s no evidence that suggests th i s , the earnings have 
leveled off at the present rate for the expected fu ture / Each 
one of the pathologists charges rates identical to the others, 
and there i s no speci f ic reward for seniority or length of 
service. The income of these pathologists i s expected to be set 
by the fa ir market place in the future. The defendant's 
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accountant has high credibility, the plaintiff's expert is not 
credible. There is no reason the defendant should pay the 
plaintiff's experts. 
9. Each party has funds from which they may pay their 
own attorney. The Court finds that each of the parties have 
employed their attorney and relied upon their attorney in good 
faith. Each party will bear their own attorney's fees. 
10. The value of the professional corporation stock is 
as indicated by the defendant's accountant. 
11. The Court has considered the defendant's contention 
that the plaintiff should be forced to either find employment or 
charged as though she were working. It is recognized that, in 
this day and age, it is rare to see a 44 year old woman, in good 
health, with a college degree, who has no serious plans for 
employment. The Court is also aware of the fact that she does 
have an 8 year old child at home. She should be encouraged to 
work eventually. She is not to be considered to have changed the 
circumstances if she finds employment, so long as the earnings do 
not exceed $1,300 or $1,400 per month. 
DATED this Ql day of March, 1987. 
Ad 
JOH*I F. WAHLQUIST, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this S O day of March, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Stephen W. Farr 
FARR, KAUFMAN & HAMILTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Tim W. Healy 
Attorney for Defendant 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Vs^ 
A CARR, Secretary 
PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT 
1/20/87 
ASSETS 
Note: 
CASH: 
HOUSE: 
CARS: 
The following values are approximate although the cash will 
be equally divided. 
STOCKS: 
checking 
liquid money 
Continental Bank 
Continental Bank 
American 1st 
Peoples 1st 
Ogden 1st 
American Savings 
Merrill Lynch Ready Assets 
Continental Bank 
20,000 
7,500 
17,000 
7,700 
7,000 
9,000 
38,000 
l T f fif)4 
$ 119,204 
Gross value 
Mortgage 
Net Value 
$130,000 
34,000 
$ 96,000 
Award to plaintiff as shai 
of assets 
** Pay off mortgage out of cash, leaving $85,204 in 
available cash to be divided. 
Bear Lake Cabin - our 1/3 value - $10,000. This should go to 
plaintiff since the other owners are members of her fami ly 
and since it was built at the request of her father who 
asked defendant to help fund it. 
1985 Chevrolet Astro Van 
1987 Chevrolet Spectrum 
1984 Dodge Daytona 
$11 ,000 
No Equity 
6 f 000 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
* * Defendant does not know the equity in the Chevy 
Spectrum or how it was paid for. 
Insured Income Properties (FFCA) E. F. Hutton $10,000 
Several stocks at Merrill Lynch 37,280 
MUNICIPAL BONDS: 
Merrill Lynch 
E«F. Hutton 
A/0 1/31/87 
SOUTH GATE LODGE (Not liquid) 
ASSOCIATES OF PATHOLOGY STOCK 
BOAT: $11,000 - Plaintiff 
$37,057 
74,192 
116,628 
$ 10,500 
$ 14,521 
INSURANCE POLICIES -
Cash value of $4,099 
Page -2-
A OF P PENSION PLAN $405,000 
LOAN TO DEAN JOHNSON $ 900 
HOME FURNISHINGS % 12,000 - plaintiff 
TOTAL ASSETS $857,0 08 
Page - 3 -
JANET VAL 
House $130,000 
Cars 11,000 
Cabin 10,000 
Boat 11,000 
Furniture 12,000 
% of cash 42,602 
\ of stock 18,644 
Addition cash in lieu 
of A of P stocks life ins. 
cash value 9309.00 
Share of Pension 
Trust 183,950 
TOTAL $428,504 
*** Plaintiff will be liable for any taxes 
on Pension trust or must roll it over JM&/&* 
into an IRA, (the same as defendant 
would have to do if he had the Pension 
trust funds distributed) . 
Other items such as silverware, china, porcelain to be divided 
equally, traded against other items of similar value or purchased 
for cash for the value of the other parties interest. 
Other items to be balanced against each other (e.g. photo equipment 
to defendant, sewing machines to plaintiff; snowblower to defendant, 
ATC 3 wheeler to plaintiff, stereo to defendant, plaintiff may 
have Lenox china & Lunt silverware in return for \ of their value to 
defendant or the parties may divide said china & silverware. 
Municipal Bonds should to to defendant because he is the party in 
the ongoing taxable situation with earned income and also because 
he is assuming non-liquid assets such as South Gates Apartments 
and Assoc, of Pathology stock, and since defendant is providing 
other benefits such as insurance and health insurance, and is 
assuming debt on the insurance loans. Plaintiff will also receive 
less from the pension trust and therefore will have less consequence 
than defendant on that item. 
Defendant has provided bank accounts of more than $16,000 for each 
of the 3 children. This money should not be considered in the 
settlement, but defendant should remain as custodian jointly 
with the children on h of the accounts and plaintiff should remain 
as custodian jointly with the children on the other k of the accounts. 
Since defendant will be providing nearly all of the childrens1 
financial support, and since the child support money is taxable to him 
and not to plaintiff, it should be stipulated in the divorce decree 
that the children be listed as his dependents for tax purposes. 
; 26,791 Share of cash 
18,644 \ of stock 
10,000 FFCA-E.F.Hut ton 
10,500 South Gate Lodge 
14,521 A of P Stock 
4,099 Life Ins. cash value 
900 Loan to Dean 
Municipal bonds MLPF&S 
116,628 and E.F. Hutt 
220,421 Pension trust share 
6,000 Car 
$428,504 Total 
257Z7£ /&&/>&§ Xtyh* 
JOHNSON VS JOHNSON 
TIMELINE OF MEDICAL TRAINING 
JANET JOHNSON'S EARNINGS 
WORKED AT THE ST. LOUIS 
GLOBE DEMOCRAT 
28 WEEKS © $90 
52 WEEKS © $105 
52 WEEKS © $115 
$ 2,520 
5,460 
5.980 
ff£960 
COMPARE-
LIVING COSTS 
RENT 
FOOD 
UTILITIES 
ENTERTAINMENT 
TRAVEL 
CLOTHING 
MEDICAL 
MISC. 
FEES, BOOKS 
SAVINGS & TAXES 
^ . 
150 
100 
50 
0 
50 
MIN 
0 
50 
75 
475 
X 31 MO 
$14,725 
MARRIAGE 
8 / 1 9 / 6 6 
(PRE-MARRIAGE: 
YAL JOHNSON-1 YEAR 
MEDICAL SCHOOL 
JANET JOHNSON-BA IN 
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT) 
ENTERED PRACTICE 
ASSOCIATES OF PATHOLOGY 
JOHNSON VS. JOHNSON 
VALUATION OF MEDICAL LICENSE 
SCENARIO 1 
AV6, COLLEGE 6RADUATE INCOME VS. AV6. PATHOLOGIST INCOME 
SCHEDUU A 
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF LICENSE 
PERIOD YEAR 
1 1987 
2 1988 
3 1989 
4 1990 
5 1991 
6 1992 
7 1993 
8 1994 
9 1995 
f 19% 
1 1997 
2 1998 
3 1999 
4 2000 
5 2001 
8 2902 
7 2083 
8 2004 
DR. 
JOHNSON'S 
A6E 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
58 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
INCOME FOR 
COLLEGE 
GRADUATE 
$52,313 
56,898 
61,862 
67,303 
73,199 
78,235 
83,618 
89,371 
95,519 
102,091 
109,115 
116,622 
124,646 
133,221 
142,437 
151,282 
160,677 
170,655 
TAX 
$14,648 
15,931 
17,327 
18,845 
20,496 
21,906 
23,413 
25,024 
26,745 
28,585 
38,552 
32,654 
34,901 
37,302 
39,882 
42,359 
44,990 
47,783 
INCOME FOR 
C0LLE6E 
GRADUATE INCOME FOR 
AFTER TAX PATHOLOGIST 
$37,667 
40,967 
44,555 
48,458 
52,703 
56,329 
60,205 
64,347 
68,774 
73| 506 
78,563 
83,968 
89,745 
95,919 
102,555 
108,923 
115,687 
122,872 
$129,560 
141,972 
155,572 
207,274 
227,131 
248,890 
272,734 
298,862 
327,492 
358,866 
393,246 
430,919 
472,201 
517,437 
567,008 
621,327 
688,850 
746,076 
1 
TAX 
$36,277 
39,752 
43,560 
58,037 
63,597 
69,689 
76,366 
83,681 
91,698 
100,482 
110,109 
120,657 
132,216 
144,882 
158,762 
173,972 
190,638 
INCOME FOR 
PATHOLOGIST 
AFTERTAX 
$93,283 
102,220 
112,012 
149,237 
163,534 
179,201 
196,368 
215,181 
235,794 
258,384 
283,137 
310,262 
339,985 
372,555 
408,246 
447,355 
490,212 
AFTER TAX 1 
DIFFERENCE 
$55,616 
61,253 
67,457 
100,779 
110,831 
122,872 
136,163 
150,834 
167,020 
184,878 
204,574 
226,294 
250,240 
276,636 
305,691 
338,432 
374,525 
PRESENT 
t/ALUE FACTOR 
0 9.39* 
0.9561173 
0.8740445 
0.7990169 
0.7304295 
0.6677297 
0.6104120 
0.5580145 
0.5101147 
0.4663266 
0.4262973 
0.3897041 
0.3562520 
0.3256715 
0.2977159 
0.2721601 
0.2487980 
0.2274412 
208,901 537,175 414,303 0.2079178 
PRESENT VALUE OF LICENSE AT JANUARY 1, 1987 
OFFSET FOR INVESTMENT IN LICENSE INCLUOING ACCRUED INTEREST TO JANUARY 1, 1987 
PRESENT 
VALUE 
53,175 
53,538 
53,899 
73,612 
74,005 
75,003 
75,981 
76,943 
77,886 
78,813 
79,723 
80,618 
81,496 
82,359 
83,197 
84,201 
85,182 
86,141 
1,355,772 
(199,346) 
CUMULATIVE 
PRESENT 
VALUE 
53,175 
106,713 
160,612 
234,224 
308,229 
383,232 
459,213 
536,156 
614,042 
692,855 
772,578 
853,1% 
934,692 
1,017,051 
1,100,248 
1,184,449 
1,269,631 
1,355,772 
NET PRESENT VALUE OF LICENSE AT JANUARY 1, 1987 $1,156,426 
JOHNSON VS JOHNSON 
SUMMARY OF VALUATION METHODS 
$162,980 DR. JOHNSOr.'.: 1985 INCOME (1986 - £ : 80,580) 
$2,785 MORE 
PER MONTH 
$129,560 
VALUE OF MEDICAL PRACTICE: $154,997 
AVERAGE PAT:: J .OGIST INCOME 
$6,437 MORE 
PER MONTH 
$ 5 2 , v j ! v> 
VALUE OF MEDICAL LICENSE: $1,156,426 
AVERAGE CC L E € GRADUATE INCOME 
EXHIBIT 
Child Support 
Child's Name Date of Birth Age 
ERIK VAL JOHNSON October 30, 1971 16% 
JENNIFER JOHNSON January 22, 1973 14 
JAMIE ANNE JOHNSON November 30, 1978 8 
Defendant had earnings in 1986 as follov.Ts: 
a. Regular income Associates of $ 150,580.00 
Pathology 
b. Interest and dividends $ 10, 000 . 00 
c. Contribution to pension and profit...$ 30,000.00 
plan 
Total income for 1986 $ 190,580.00 
Gross monthly income $ 15,881.66 
The Uniform Child Support Schedule is calculated to gross monthly 
earnings of $9,955.00. Accordingly, the defendant has gross 
income of $5,926.00 per month above the maximum chart schedule. 
For three children, child support is per the maximum chart income 
level, plus $6.00 per month per child for each $89.00 of 
additional gross income. Accordingly, defendant should pay child 
support at the maximum chart income level of $648.00 per month per 
child, plus an additional $399.00 per month per child, for a total 
of $1,047.00 per month per child. ^r?/ n) 
JOHNSON vs. JOHNSON 
Civil No. 94737 
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